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Abstract
Gerbner and Gross’s cultivation theory predicts that prolonged exposure to TV violence creates fear of crime,
symptomatic of a mean world syndrome. We tested the theory’s prediction in a time series model with annual changes
in violence portrayal on popular US TV shows from 1972 to 2010 as a predictor of changes in public perceptions of local
crime rates and fear of crime. We found that contrary to the prediction that TV violence would affect perceptions of
crime rates, TV violence directly predicted fear of crime holding constant national crime rates and perceptions of crime
rates. National crime rates predicted fear of crime but only as mediated by perceptions of local crime rates. The
findings support an interpretation of cultivation theory that TV drama transports viewers into a fictive world that
creates fear of crime but without changing perceptions of a mean world.
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1. Introduction
“Fearful people are more dependent, more easily
manipulated and controlled, more susceptible to
deceptively simple, strong, tough measures and
hard-line postures—both political and religious.
They may accept and even welcome repression if it
promises to relieve their insecurities. That is the
deeper problem of violence-laden television.”
George Gerbner, Ph.D, testimony before a U.S.
House of Representatives Sub Committee, October
21, 1981 (Gerbner, 1981a, p. 7).
Cultivaton theory, developed by Gerbner and Gross
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41

(1976) and colleagues (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, & Shanahan, 2002), is among the three most cited
theories in communication research (Bryant & Miron,
2004). Gerbner et al. argued that television (TV), as the
dominant cultural medium, cultivated a social reality
that was often at odds with objective reality. They
were particularly interested in the effects of violent TV
content, which they predicted would create fear of
others in audiences. Indeed, “[F]ear—that historic
instrument of social control—may be an even more
critical residue of a show of violence than aggression”
(Gerbner & Gross, 1976, p. 178). Gerbner et al.
supported this contention with their pioneering
Cultural Indicators Project’s (CIP), which content
analyzed TV programming and found extensive violent
31

content (Morgan, Shanahan, & Signorielli, 2008). They
proposed that long-term heavy exposure to such TV
content would gradually cultivate unrealistic fear and
heightened mistrust of others.
Analysis of national surveys revealed that heavy TV
viewers overestimated the prevalence of violence and
the presence of police (Gerbner, Gross, Signorielli,
Morgan, & Jackson‐Beeck, 1979). When heavy viewers
were asked whether they would be ‘afraid to walk
alone at night in their neighborhood,’ they were more
likely to answer yes than light viewers. Gerbner and
colleagues named this phenomenon the ‘mean world
syndrome,’ which consisted of viewing the world as a
dangerous and violent place, where people ‘just looked
out for themselves,’ and ‘could not be trusted’ (Gerb‐
ner, Gross, Morgan, Signorielli, 1980).
Despite its influence on media research, cultivation
theory met with considerable criticism. For example,
Doob and Macdonald (1979) challenged it with the
finding that heavy TV viewing by survey respondents
no longer predicted fear of their environment after
controlling for the amount of crime in their Toronto,
Canada neighborhoods. Further criticism of cultivation
theory came from Hughes (1980) and Hirsch (1980,
1981), who reanalyzed the surveys analyzed by Gerbner
and colleagues and found that cultivation effects were
no longer present after demographic controls were
added. They argued instead that evidence of cultivation
could be explained by patterns of TV viewing by various
demographic groups (e.g., those of low income or low
education) that were also more likely to mistrust others.
Gerbner and colleagues responded to these
criticisms (Gerbner, 1981b; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, &
Signorielli, 1981) by emphasizing the concepts of
resonance and mainstreaming to correct for the effects
of potential demographic differences (Gerbner, Gross,
Morgan, & Signorielli, 1980). However, the field continued
to identify limitations in the cultivation approach.
Whereas the theory initially proposed that cultivation
effects were attributable to the entire body of TV
content, subsequent research suggested that it might
only apply to specific types of programming. For example,
in a survey of Florida adults, Chiricos, Eschholz, and
Gertz (1997) found that watching TV news and listening
to radio news predicted fear of crime. Romer, Jamieson
and Aday (2003) found that fear of crime was
cultivated by local and national TV news reporting
rather than overall TV viewing. In addition, Dowler
(2003) analyzed a 1995 national sample of adults and
found a weak relation between watching crime shows
and fear of crime but no prediction for the amount of TV
hours watched per week. Thus, it became clearer that the
type of programming watched could be an important
factor predicting cultivation effects (Romer et al, 2014).
Despite the critiques, a 1997 meta-analysis by Morgan
(1996) of a comprehensive published bibliography of
cultivation studies since 1976 found a small but significant
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41

overall cultivation effect, r = 0.091. Nevertheless,
nearly all of the research included in the analysis was
cross-sectional. Therefore it remains an open question
whether the effects of TV viewing on fear of crime are
attributable to TV content or are the result of
confounds from subsets of the population more
inclined to watch shows that feature crime (e.g., police
dramas or local news) and more likely to be fearful
apart from TV exposure.
Previous research has also not tested a striking feature
of cultivation theory, that heavy viewing of fictional TV
programming can change perceptions of the world, so
that those perceptions become more consistent with
fictional TV than with the reality that viewers confront on
a daily basis in their lives. It is not difficult to imagine that
news programming might influence viewers’ perceptions
of crime rates (Lowry, Nio, & Leitner, 2003; Romer, Jamieson, & Aday, 2003) but such a prediction regarding
fictional TV is more controversial.
The present research was designed to help evaluate
the theory’s prediction regarding fictional TV pro‐
gramming. Rather than studying a cross-section of the
population, our study examined changes over time in
national exposure to violent TV content sampled from
the Coding of Health and Media Project (CHAMP, see
www.YouthMediaRisk.org). This project conducted a
content analysis of TV programming from 1950 to the
present that focused on one type of programming that
should produce cultivation effects on fear of crime,
namely popular prime-time dramas featuring stories
with police, legal, medical, and western themes. By
examining annual deviations from trend in violent TV
content, this time series analysis (Diebold, 2007) can
evaluate the relationship between the public’s
perceptions of crime prevalence and its fears of crime
as reported in Gallup’s national opinion surveys. This
eliminates the problem of confounds due to demographic
and viewing pattern differences because these
characteristics would not be expected to change from
year to year. In addition, annual changes in violent TV
content can be distinguished from changes in police
reports of violent crime, thereby providing a relatively
clean prediction of the effects of TV fictional content
on the public’s reported fear.
We also tested a model that could determine
whether the relationship between fictional TV violence
and fear of crime was mediated by changes in perceptions
of real-world crime prevalence, as cultivation theory
would predict. According to cultivation theory, fictional
TV creates an impression of a mean world that should
mediate the experience of fear. However, an alternative
explanation suggests that violent programs, by
dramatizing the effects of violence, can influence fear
without affecting perceptions of real-world crime.
Suspending disbelief in dramas is a powerful
mechanism that allows viewers to identify with the
characters and experience their emotions vicariously,
32

in a sense “transporting” them into the world of the
drama (Green & Dill, 2013). For example, in an early
study of the effects of transportation in TV ads,
Deighton, Romer and McQueen (1989) found that TV
ads classified as dramas, rather than persuasive
arguments, were processed emotionally more than
cognitively and persuaded consumers by engaging
them empathically. Dramas were just as successful in
persuading consumers as factual appeals, but the
mechanism was different, relying instead on the
audience’s ability to place (i.e., “transport”) itself into
the actors’ world and experience the actor’s use of the
product. Similarly, this process could explain an
emotional fear reaction in an audience viewing violent
TV dramas. In other words, drama can transport the
audience without necessarily affecting perceptions of
the prevalance of crime in their daily environment.
Repeated TV show exposure can also encourage parasocial relations between the audience and the show’s
characters (Schiappa, Allen, & Gregg, 2007), an effect
that can heighten the empathic experience elicited by
identification with TV characters. Green & Brock built
transportation theory on these mechanisms, which can
explain audiences’ affect-based involvement with fictional characters (Green & Dill, 2013). Oatley (1999) also
argued that identification and sympathy with the protagonists goals or the re-experience of emotions triggered by the drama could enhance the impact of fictional depictions. Thus, we proposed that transportation
mechanisms may explain changes over time in the cultivation of fear of crime predicted by violence in fictional
TV dramas and could do so apart from changes in perceptions of real world crime prevalence.

3. Method

sodes from 1972 to 2010 that were available for purchase as identified by Brooks and Marsh (Brooks &
Marsh, 2009) and Nielsen’s website http://www.
nielsen.com/us/en.html. We began the study series in
1972 because it was the year when national survey data regarding crime issues became more regular on an
annual basis. Sampled TV shows across the decades included crime, detective, and medical genres, such as
Kojak and Hawaii Five-O from the 1970’s, Hill Street
Blues and Trapper John M.D. from the 1980’s, Law and
Order and ER from the 1990’s, and CSI: Crime Scene Investigation and House M.D. from 2000–2010. The
shows we sampled remained popular over time, making it likely that we could capture the same audiences
from year to year. For a list of sampled TV shows by
year, see www.YouthMediaRisk.org. Because TV seasons cover two calendar years, the study examined TV
episodes that ran in the spring and fall of the same
year so that they could be compared with annual
measures of fear of crime, perceptions of violent crime
prevalence, and FBI reports of crime.
When available, every other episode was coded per
season, or if fewer than six episodes were available for
purchase, all available episodes were coded. We coded
fall and spring seasons separately to enable a match
between TV content changes and the most closely corresponding Gallup survey from the spring or fall of the
25 available years of the fear of crime data. The sample
totaled 475.4 hours of commercial-free programming
from 1972 to 2010 with a mean of 19.0 hours per year
(standard deviation = 11.2). The study did not seek I.R.B.
approval because it did not involve human subjects.
The dramas in our sample reflected a popular part of
the prime-time TV landscape based on examination of
Nielsen household viewership shares, which estimate
the percentage of TV households tuned to a program
(Local Media Market Solutions, 2012). Because household TV penetration is available for every fifth year (Local Media Market Solutions, 2012), we calculated shares
for those years from 1975–2005 as follows: (sum of Nielsen shares for TV shows in year) × (% of households with
TV in the same year). These scores, estimated every 10
years, show the total household shares annually exposed to the sampled shows. The show values were 43.0
in 1975, 63.5 in 1985, 58.4 in 1995, and 106.0 in 2005.
Shares increased since 1975 because in later years more
shows were available for coding and the proportion of
households with TV increased. These share totals indicate that sizeable proportions of households were exposed each week to the TV shows during the fall and
spring seasons (excluding reruns).

3.1. TV Sample Selection

3.2. Coding of TV Violence Sequences

For the purposes of this study, we used the Coding of
Health and Media Project (CHAMP) content analysis of
the top 30 prime-time drama network television epi-

Twenty undergraduate students were trained to master a codebook of rules for the identification of violent
and other content (see http://youthmediarisk.org for

2. Research Questions
Given our ability to evaluate changes in violent TV
content over time, we posed two research questions:
RQ1: Do changes in this programming from year to
year correlate with corresponding changes in
national levels of fear of crime apart from official
national crime rates? and
RQ2: if the violence rate in TV programming
correlates with fear, is this relation mediated by
changes in perceptions of real world crime rates or
by other processes, such as by transporting
audiences into experiencing fear apart from levels
of violence reflected in those rates?
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the codebook). Training was based on about 21 hours
of TV content. Coders were required to exhibit a high
level of reliability using Krippendorff’s alpha formula
(Krippendorff, 2012) (Kα > 0.80), which controls for
chance agreement across coders. The typical coding
unit was either a 4- or 4.5-minute segment based on dividing half-hour episodes without commercials (20 mins)
into 5 equal segments and dividing hour long episodes
with no commercials (45 mins) into 10 segments. Hence,
the coding unit was made as close as possible to the 4minute length of half-hour episodes, which were the
dominant episode length. Because this could produce
more violent segments for shorter episodes, we converted violence rates to a time-based based metric (i.e.,
instances per commercial free episode hour).
The definition of violence was adapted from
previous research (Yokota & Thompson, 2000) as follows, “Physical acts where the aggressor makes or at‐
tempts to make some physical contact with the intention of causing injury or death” and “intentional acts
where the aggressor makes or attempts to make some
physical contact that has potential to inflict injury or
harm.” We excluded natural disasters; accidents, ob‐
jects not attributed to a character, and expected physical acts in sport games that are not intended to seriously injure (tackling, checking, boxing, stunts). The
violence measure did not differentiate violence that
may produce more or less fear such as between
stranger versus family violence or violence committed
in self defense. We assumed these features would not
change dramatically from year to year and thus would
not explain any relations we found with fear of crime.
Violent acts were counted as “sequences of vio‐
lence” (Bushman, Jamieson, Weitz, & Romer, 2013). A
sequence of violence was defined as an uninterrupted
display of a character or a group of characters engaged
in acts of violence. Violence was coded as uninterrupted if the character used one weapon or method continuously, regardless of the number of victims. Violence counts of 25 or more sequences per 5 minute
segment were recoded to a value of 25. The sum of
violent sequences per coding segment was the measure of violence in a segment. Reliability for identifying
TV violent sequences was high (Kα = 0.87).
We coded fall and spring episodes separately so
that we could match TV violence rates more closely to
the time of year when the Gallup survey was taken. In
some of the years (24%), Gallup surveyed fear closer to
the spring TV schedule. For each time period, we
calculated the mean of the log transformed violence
rates across episodes and converted the scores back
into the actual rate per episode hour. The fall and
spring violence rates were highly correlated (r = 0.61).
3.3. Assessment of Fear and Prevalence of Crime
Survey data collected by the Gallup Poll from 1972 to
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41

2010 were used to assess national rates of the US public’s fear of crime and perceptions of crime prevalence.
The Gallup Poll is a demographically weighted randomdigit-dialed national telephone survey that asks the following question of respondents ages 18+: “Is there any‐
where near where you live that is, within a mile, where
you would be afraid to walk alone at night?” (Gallup,
2010a). The annual percent of yes responses was used
to measure fear of crime. There were years in which
the question was not asked, leaving us with 25 time
points between 1972 and 2010.
The Gallup survey was used rather than results for
the same question in the National Opinion Reseach
Council’s General Social Survey (GSS) because Gallup
covered a longer time period and was a nationally representative telephone sample rather than the GSS,
which uses in-person home-based interviews that may
have introduced a sample bias by only including respondents who were not fearful of strangers (i.e., being interviewed in their homes).
The perception of crime prevalence was assessed
using the same Gallup national telephone survey question for ages 18+: “Is there more crime in your area
than there was a year ago, or less?” (Gallup, 2010b).
The percent that responded ‘more’ was used as the
measure of perceived prevalence. There were years in
which the question was not asked, leaving us with 22
time points between 1972 and 2010 for this item.
3.4. National Violent Crime Rate
The annual national violent crime rate was taken from
the FBI uniform crime reports (Bureau of Justice
Staistics, 2013), which had data for every year since
1972. It measures the rate per 100,000 persons of
violent crimes reported to the police in the U.S. This
index includes murder, non-negligent manslaughter,
forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.
3.5. Data Analysis
Curve fitting for identifying best fitting trends was
conducted using SPSS 20.0. The study variables were
detrended by identifying the best fitting polynomial
function for non-missing cases as measured by
adjusted R2. Residuals from the best fitting polynomial
function served as the measure of annual deviations
from trend (Diebold, 2007). These residuals were also
evaluated graphically to confim stationarity (i.e., that
the overall level and deviations from the mean of the
series did not change over time after removing the
underlying time trend), an important prerequisite for
analyzing relations between time series (Diebold, 2007).
The program MPlus version 7.1 (Muthén & Muthén,
2013) was used to fit a structural equation model
(SEM) to test the model in Figure 1, including tests of
mediation (MacKinnon, 2008). Robust standard errors
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were applied to protect against violations of normality,
correlated errors, and heteroscedasticity. The program
only included non-missing cases (N = 25) for reported
fear, the dependent variable. Missing data for perception of crime (16%) were handled using full information
maximum likelihood (FIML) procedures. Model fit was
good after dropping the nonsignificant path from TV vio-

lence rate to perception of crime using multiple indices
of global fit and residual diagnostics. The indices included a low χ2(1) = 0.029, p = 0.866 and root-mean-squareerror-of-approximation (RMSEA) value = 0.000; high values of the comparative fit index (CFI) = 1.00 and the
Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) = 1.14. All tests were two tailed,
and 95% confidence intervals (CI) are reported.

Figure 1. Standardized solution for the structural equation model of predictors of fear of
crime (all variables detrended). Dashed paths are nonsignificant.

Figure 2. TV violence rate (left) and percentage of population reporting fear of crime (right)
with best fitting trends and upper (UCI) and lower (LCI) 95% confidence intervals, 19722010.
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41
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4. Results
As seen in Figure 2, TV violence exhibited a quadratic
trend over the study period (adj. R2 = 0.60, p ≤ 0.001)
dropping rapidly from 1972 to the mid 1990s before
rising again to 2010. This violence count per episode
hour declined from 6.5 in 1972 to a minimum of 1.4 in
1996 and rose again to 3.7 in 2010 (mean = 3.4). Fear
of crime followed a cubic trend (adj. R2 = 0.75, p ≤
0.001) that also declined from a high point in the
1980’s to rise again in the 2000’s. The variable ranged
from 42% in 1972 to 30% in 2001 and rose again to
37% in 2010 (mean = 39.4%). As seen in Table 1, these
two raw rates were correlated (r = 0.469). It is noteworthy that the FBI national crime rate was inversely
related to the TV violence rate (r = -0.483) but positively related to fear (r = 0.388). The violent crime rate
ranged from a maximum of 758.2 in 1991 to a minimum of 404.5 in 2010 (mean = 553.4). However, the
FBI crime rate was unrelated to perceptions of crime
(r= 0.174), which declined from 51% in 1972 to 26% in
2001 and rose again to 49% in 2010 (mean = 44.4%).
Nevertheless, perceptions of crime and reported fear
of crime were strongly correlated (r= 0.544).
The detrended time series for TV violence and fear
are shown in Figure 3. Detrended series for national
crime rates, perceptions of crime prevalence, and fear

of crime are in Figure 4. As seen in Table 1, Detrended
TV violence and fear of crime were not significantly
correlated at the bivariate level (r = 0.222). However,
the detrended violent crime rate was associated with
detrended fear of crime (r = 0.373) and especially with
perceptions of crime prevalence (r = 0.705) As with the
raw trends, detrended perceptions of crime prevalence
were associated with fear of crime (r = 0.640).
The SEM results in Table 2 show that TV violence
was correlated with fear after controlling for national
crime rates. However, this relationship was direct with
no mediation by crime prevalence perceptions (see
also Figure 1). In addition, national crime rates were
related to fear but the relationship was mediated by
perceptions of crime prevalence. The total effect of
national crime rates on fear as mediated by perceptions
of crime prevalence was significant. Total hours of coded TV programming per year (i.e., the closest matching
fall or spring TV episodes per year matched in time
with the closest half year when Gallup surveyed fear)
did not change the pattern of results when added to
the SEM analysis. Using the full year of TV violence
with both the spring and fall seasons rather than the
season closest to when the Gallup fear survey question
was taken produced a similar but somewhat less reliable result (p < 0.05).

Table 1. Pearson correlations (N) for detrended (bottom) and raw (top) study variables, 1972–2010.
Fear of Crime
TV violence rate
Perception of crime FBI crime rate
Fear of Crime
(25)
0.469** (25)
0.544** (21)
0.388* (25)
TV violence
0.222 (25)
(25)
0.183 (21)
-0.483** (25)
Perception of crime
0.640*** (21)
-0.186 (21)
(22)
0.174 (22)
FBI Crime rate
0.373* (25)
-0.323 (25)
0.705*** (22)
(39)
Note: *p ≤ 0.10, **p ≤ 0.05, ***p ≤ 0.01

Figure 3. Detrended standardized scores for TV violence rate per hour and fear of
crime, 1972–2010.
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Figure 4. Detrended standardized scores for the national violent crime rate,
perceptions of crime, and fear of crime, 1972–2010.
Table 2. Model parameters and tests for detrended predictors of fear of crime with tests for mediation, 1972–2010.
Independent variables
b
95% CI
P value
Fear of Crime
TV violence
0.968
0.510, 1.43
0.000
Perceived crime rate
0.229
0.089, 0.368
0.001
National (FBI) crime rate
0.002
-.020, 0.024
0.858
Perception of Crime
National (FBI) crime rate
0.116
0.068, 0.165
0.000
Mediation
Total effect of FBI crime rate on Fear of crime
0.029
0.010, 0.047
0.002
FBI crime rate  Perceived crime  Fear of crime
0.027
0.004, 0.049
0.020

5. Discussion
We tested predictions informed by cultivation theory
that annual changes in violent content of popular U.S.
TV dramas would predict the American public’s percep‐
tion of local crime rates and its fear of crime and that
these relations would occur independently of national
violent crime rates. We tested these predictions using
a structural equation model in which perceptions of
crime rates mediated effects of both TV violence and
national crime rates on fear of crime. We found that
although national crime rates predicted perceptions of
local crime rates, TV violence did not. Rather, the results suggest that TV violence was directly related to
fear of crime with no significant mediation by perceptions of local crime rates. National crime rates also
predicted fear but only as mediated by perceptions of
local crime rates.
Our findings supported an important prediction of
cultivation theory that the rate of TV drama violence
predicts reported fear of crime. However, TV drama viMedia and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41

olence did not predict audience perceptions of crime
prevalence. Instead, national crime rates compiled by
the FBI were related to perceptions of local crime
rates, and these perceptions mediated the relation between crime rates and fear. Thus, the results suggest
that the public’s perceptions of changes in local crime
rates may be sensitive to changes in police reports of
crime but not to changes in the amount of violence
shown in TV dramas.
The study results are consistent with the prediction
from transportation theories that TV drama violence
can influence fear but not necessarily by changing the
audience’s beliefs about the prevalence of crime in
their local environments. Therefore, we interpret the
results as supporting the hypothesis derived from
transportation theories (Green & Brock, 2000) that TV
audiences may be transported into a fictive world in
which the effects of portrayed violence are experienced emotionally by the audience but do not lead to
changes in the perceived prevalence of crime. Indeed,
theories of drama suggest that it is often the willing
37

suspension of disbelief that enables audiences to empathize with characters and thereby to experience
their emotions (Green & Brock, 2000). And although
this experience can be quite powerful, these results
suggest it does not necessarily require changes in perceptions of the prevalence of the dramatized experience in the real world.
There is evidence that non-fiction media exposure,
such as in TV and radio news (Chiricos, Eschholz, &
Gertz, 1997) and police reality shows (Holbert, Shah, &
Kwak, 2004), perhaps because they are perceived as
real, generate fear in the public. For example, Lowry,
Nio, and Leitner (2003) used agenda setting as the theoretical explanation for the finding that national network news predicted crime as the nation’s ‘most im‐
portant problem.’ Consistent with cultivation theory,
Romer, Jamieson, and Aday (2003) found that local TV
news in cities with high coverage of crime predicted
fear of crime and crime perceptions. Holbert, Shah, and
Kwak (2004) analyzed a two-year national probability
sample and reported that while viewing crime dramas
did not predict fear of crime, exposure to television
news and police reality programs did. They attributed
this difference to police reality programs being perceived as more real. We find it noteworthy that both
TV violence and fear of crime have changed in tandem
over time in recent years even though the actual violent crime rate has declined over this period (not
shown) (Gallup, 2010a). Therefore, this pattern suggests that TV dramatic portrayals have increased fears
of crime despite the decline in the actual violent crime
rate. We do not have measures of TV news progamming that could tell us whether the reporting of crime
has declined over this period. However, it is likely that
TV news trends have captured at least some of the national violent crime rate trend. In addition, by holding
constant perceived prevalence of crime, we have controlled some of the potential influence of TV news,
which would be expected to affect this perception.
Consistent with Gerbner’s cultivation theory predic‐
tion that TV programming promotes fear and political
positions that favor control of crime, Rosenberger and
Callanan (2011) found that hours of TV watched predicted more severe attitudes toward the treatment of
criminals. At the same time, it is possible that viewers
of fictional TV dramas are also more likely to be exposed to TV news or other TV content that carries fear
arousing messages disseminated by political actors. Indeed, Beckett (1999) found that politicians often play
on fear of crime as a way to gain support for punitive
policies. Although we could not control for these effects, it is unlikely that these news effects would be
correlated with annual changes in fictional programming. Furthermore, our controls for changes in perceptions of crime suggest that news or other sources are
channeled through that path rather than through
changes in fictional TV programming.
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41

Because we use a time series approach that allows
us to control for demographics but at the same time
observe large changes in levels of violent programming, our findings eliminate a common problem with
cultivation studies, that they rely on cross-sectional relations between TV exposure and audience outcomes.
In our time series analysis, annual changes in TV content over time were unlikely to be related to fear of
crime due to demographic shifts. Thus, the associations
we observed between changes in TV content and public fears of crime are more likely attributable to TV violent content than to demographic shifts or changes in
viewing habits in the population. We cannot rule out
the potential influence of third variables, but the study
model controlled for national crime rates that were also linked with fear as mediated by perceptions of local
crime prevalence. Furthermore, the study provides a
stronger test than many cross-sectional studies that
have controlled demographic differences. If fear of
crime is more strongly elicited by TV dramas in certain
demographic groups, then holding those differences
constant may also remove the effects of violent TV
programming on those groups. The present study held
demographic differences constant while violent programming varied. As a result, cultivation effects may
have been more observable.
Our national time series findings may help to resolve some of the debate surrounding cultivation theory started by Doob and Macdonald (1979); Hughes
(1980); and Hirsch (1980, 1981). We have been unable
to find either a published long term time series analysis
of fear of crime predicted by TV violence or a mediation model of national violent crime rate and the perception of crime prevalence. Thus, this study employs a
novel method to test predictions from cultivation theory and finds support for one of its basic proposals. It also suggests a mechanism that can explain its effects
without relying on the creation of a mean world.
5.1. Strengths and Limitations
The study’s strengths reside on its use of a large content analysis of popular TV programming with 475
hours of commercial free TV episodes since the early
1970’s. The surveys conducted by Gallup represent in‐
terviews with over 27,000 persons. Our ability to align
TV programming with nationally representative survey
data enabled us to evaluate changes in national exposure to violent TV content after controlling for national
violent crime rates (Gallup, 2010a). Thus, despite only
being able to study 25 years of Gallup surveys, the database represents a considerable body of survey and
programming information.
This study has limitations as well. It did not sample
TV shows less popular than the Nielsen ranked top 30,
non-dramatic genres, cable TV, or YouTube. The sample
was also limited to shows that were available for pur38

chase. Nevertheless, because these shows were available years or decades later, they were likely very popular
programs when they originally aired. In addition, because many of the shows remained popular over time,
the same audiences likely saw them year after year.
TV violence in this analysis was based on the average annual rate of TV violent sequence counts per episode hour and did not differentiate between violence
that was initiated or received, or was in self-defense or
not justified. It also did not control for trends in national and local news reporting of crime that may have
influenced reports of fear.
Our analysis assumed that annual changes in TV
violence were not affected by public fear of crime,
since it seemed unlikely that changes in population
fear influenced contemporaneous changes in the
amount of violent TV programming. Nevertheless, our
analysis is still dependent on contemporaneous correlations that are not as conclusive for drawing causal
conclusions as lagged effects that provide evidence of
temporal precedence. Indeed, only carefully controlled
experiments with long-term exposure to variation in
violent TV content could clearly test the causal relation
between exposure to violent TV drama and fear of
crime. It is also necessary to note that the ecological
fallacy warns against generalizing from group to individual behavior. There could be segments of the population that were not affected by violent TV programming or that responded in other ways. For example, a
large gap has been found using the survey item regarding fear, with U.S. women much more fearful than men
(Toch & Maguire, 2014). Finally, we were limited to using the longest available measure of fear that was
available for the four decades of the study. Future research should address how audiences respond to fictive TV violence using multiple measures of fear evaluated among different audiences across age, gender,
education, racial-ethnic identity, and socioeconomic
status, while controlling for their reported media consumption and political attitudes and behaviors.
6. Conclusion
The study result that annual change in TV violence, after controlling for the violent crime rate and perceptions of crime prevalence, was significantly related to
change in national fear of crime from 1972 to 2010 is
consistent with Gerbner’s explanation of the central
tenet of cultivation theory. Indeed, he argued that the
most important problem resulting from frequent exposure to TV violence is not the direct imitation of violence by viewers, but the gradual increase in fear and
mistrust that promotes authoritarian governance. A
challenge for communication scholarship is to better
understand cultivation processes in the 21st century’s
rapidly changing technology-driven multiple media environments.
Media and Communication, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 31-41
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